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Abstract
We study how barriers to business start-up aﬀect the investment
in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to
business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in
absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowl-
edge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower in-
come and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evi-
dence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively corre-
lated with the level and growth of income.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that sustained levels of income require the adoption
of advanced technologies and innovation. A distinguished feature of modern
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1technologies such as information and communication technologies, biotech-
nologies and nanotechnologies, is the importance of skilled human capital
or knowledge. The ability of a society to innovate and grow is then de-
pendent on how human capital is accumulated, organized and the returns
shared among the participants in the innovation process. This is especially
important when the parties who provide the ﬁnancial needs—the investors—
diﬀer from those who acquire the innovation skills—innovators. For instance,
whether a certain innovation project is funded depends on the ability of the
investors to recover at least some of the returns of the project. At the same
time, workers and managers—who carry out the project and are the actual
innovators—must have the right incentives to accumulate the required skills
or knowledge. This depends on the type of contractual arrangements that
are feasible or enforceable. The goal of this paper is to study how free entry
aﬀects the accumulation of innovation skills and the growth of the economy
when contracts are not perfectly enforceable.
The limited enforceability of contracts is not only one-sided. On the
one hand, the innovator could put low eﬀort in accumulating knowledge or
quit the ﬁrm. This makes advance payments to the innovator unfeasible.
On the other, the investor could replace the innovator and renege promises
of payments. This may create an hold-up problem in the accumulation of
knowledge. The main result of the paper is to show that, given the lim-
ited enforceability of contracts, the hold-up problem in the accumulation of
knowledge arises only if there are barriers to entry. Therefore, free entry in-
creases the accumulation of knowledge and enhances income and/or growth.
With free entry, new ﬁrms compete for the skills of the innovator. This
creates an outside value for knowledge which is used by the innovator as a
threat against the investor’s attempt to renegotiate the promised payments.
Under these conditions, the innovator has an incentive to accumulate a high
level of knowledge to keep the threat value high. Because innovations make
existing capital obsolete, the higher accumulation of knowledge is ineﬃcient
at the ﬁrm level. In principle, the ﬁrm could prevent the over-accumulation
by making advance payments. However, as stressed above, this is not pos-
sible if contracts are not enforceable for the innovator. It becomes then
crucial whether the ﬁrm can commit to future payments, conditional on the
accumulation of knowledge. It is in this sense that the double-sided limited
commitment plays a crucial role in our framework. It is important to point
out that, although the higher accumulation of knowledge could be ineﬃcient
at the ﬁrm level, it may still be eﬃcient for the whole economy if there are
2‘externalities’ or ‘spillovers’.
Our result diﬀers from other papers that also study the accumulation of
skills within the ﬁrm. In some of these models the investor has full control
over the accumulation of skills or human capital. For example, in Acemoglu
& Shimer (1999) is the employer that decides the amount of training. In this
environment, greater mobility or outside opportunities hold-up the ﬁrm from
investing in training because the workers capture a larger share of the ﬁrm’s
rents. A similar result is obtained in ?). In other models, such as the one
studied in Acemoglu (1997), workers do control the accumulation of skills,
but the main conclusion does not change: greater mobility worsens the hold-
up problem and leads to lower accumulation of skills because workers are
less likely to beneﬁt from it. In our framework, instead, mobility (enhanced
by free entry) increases human capital investment when contracts are not
enforceable also for the ﬁrm.
Whether free entry enhances innovation has been a major topic of research
and debate since Schumpeter’s claim that, while product market competition
could be detrimental for innovations, competition in the innovation sector en-
courages innovations. See, for example, Aghion & Howitt (1999) and Aghion
& Griﬃth (2005). Most of the subsequent literature has focused on mar-
ket structure and product market competition. In particular, on the ability
to gain market shares and appropriate the returns to R&D, as in Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, & Howitt (2005). More closely related to our work
is Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt, & Prantl (2004). They show—both,
theoretically and empirically—that ‘ﬁrm entry’ spurs innovation in techno-
logical advanced sectors as ﬁrms try to ‘escape competition’. Acemoglu,
Aghion, & Zilibotti (2002) also study the impact of barriers to entry and
show that they are especially costly for economies closer to the technology
frontier. Diﬀerently from these studies, we focus on the less studied dimen-
sion of ‘human capital’ competition created by free entry, when contracts are
not enforceable. With limited enforceability, competition for human capital
becomes essential for growth because it keeps the market value of knowledge
high and guarantees that innovators are rewarded for their innovation eﬀorts.
Thus, free entry enhances the competition for human capital and creates the
conditions for greater innovations. Our results are consistent with cross-
country evidence showing a negative correlation between the cost of business
start-up and the level of per-capita income.
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, the labor liter-
ature that studies the hold-up problem already discussed above (e.g., Ace-
3moglu (1997), Acemoglu & Pischke (1999), Acemoglu & Shimer (1999)).
Second, the growth literature, starting with the pioneering work of Romer
(1990, 1993), that studies the economics of ideas and the link between com-
petition and innovations (e.g., Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990), Aghion et al.
(2004), Aghion et al. (2005)). Third, the growth literature that, building on
the work of economic historians (e.g., Mokyr (1990)), emphasizes the role of
barriers to riches in slowing growth (Parente & Prescott (1990)). Forth, the
literature on dynamic contracts with enforcement constraints such as Marcet
& Marimon (1992). Most of the contributions in this literature are not con-
cerned with the issue of technology adoption and innovation (one exception
is Kocherlachota (2001)) and they typically assume one-side commitment.
Another typical assumption is that default or repudiation leads to market
exclusion. In our framework, instead, the value of defaulting is the value of
re-entering the market as in Cooley, Marimon, & Quadrini (2004). It is this
feature that makes ‘free entry’ important for economic growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide cross-country
evidence on barriers to business start-up and macroeconomic performance.
Section 3 describes the model. To facilitate the intuition for the theoretical
results, Section 4 studies a simpliﬁed version of the model with only two
periods. Section 5 generalizes it to the inﬁnite horizon. Section 7 concludes.
2 Cross-country evidence
A recent publication from the World Bank (2005) provides data on the qual-
ity of the business environment for a cross-section of countries. Especially
important for this study are the variables that are proxy for the barriers to
business start-up. There are three main variables. The ﬁrst variable is the
‘cost to start a new business’. This is the average pecuniary cost needed to
set-up a corporation in the country, expressed in percentage of the country
per-capita income. The normalization of the cost of business start-up by the
level of per-capita income better captures the importance of barriers to busi-
ness start-up than the absolute dollar cost. What is relevant for the decision
to start a business is the comparison between the cost of business start-up
and the value of creating a business. Although the dollar cost is on average
higher in advanced economies, the value of a new business is also likely to be
higher.
The second proxy for the barriers to business start-up is the ‘number of
bureaucratic procedures’ that need to be ﬁled before starting a new business.
4The third proxy is the average ‘length of time’ required to start a new busi-
ness. Figure 1 plots the level of per-capita GDP in 2004 against these three
indicators. All variables are in log. The three panels show a strong negative
correlation indicating that the set-up of a new business is more costly and
cumbersome in poor countries.
The cost of business start-up is also negatively correlated with economic
growth. To show this, we regress the average growth in per-capita GDP
from 2000 to 2004 (the ﬁve more recent years) to the cost of business start-
up. We also include the 1999 per-capita GDP to control for the initial level
of development. The estimation results, with t-statistics in parenthesis, are
reported in the top section of Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the cost
of business start-up is negatively associated with growth even if we control for
the level of economic development. Therefore, countries with lower barriers
to entry tend to experience faster growth. This ﬁnding is robust to the
choice of alternative years to compute the average growth rate. The other
proxies for the barriers to entry—speciﬁcally, the number of procedures and
the time required to start a new business—are also negatively correlated
with the average growth rate but they are not statistically signiﬁcant at the
conventional levels (1 or 5 percent).
To show that these ﬁndings are not an artifact of normalizing the cost
of business start-up by the level of per-capita income, the bottom section of
Table 1 repeats the same regression estimation but using dollar values, in
log, of the cost of business start-up. Again, the cost of business start-up is
statistical signiﬁcant with a negative sign. In this regression, however, the
initial per-capita GDP is no longer signiﬁcant.
To summarize, the general picture portrayed by the data is that the eco-
nomic development and growth of a country is negatively associated with the
cost of starting a business. Of course, correlations do not imply causations.
In the following sections we present a model where the correlation is driven
by the cost of business start-up, that is, barriers to entry lead to lower income
and growth.
3 The model
There are two types of agents in the economy: a continuum of ‘entrepre-
neurs’ of total mass m > 1 and a continuum of ‘innovators’ of total mass
1. Therefore, innovators are in short supply relatively to the number of
entrepreneurs. The lifetime utilities for entrepreneurs and innovators are,
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Figure 1: Barriers to business start-up and level of development.
6Table 1: Cost of business start-up and growth.
Initial Cost
Constant Per-Capita of Business
GDP Start-Up
(a) Coeﬃcients 15.55 -1.16 -1.04
t-Statistics (5.01) (-3.81) (-4.92)
R-square 0.150
N. of countries 140
(b) Coeﬃcients 6.02 0.20 -0.83
t-Statistics (3.08) (0.94) (-3.75)
R-square 0.093
N. of countries 140
NOTES: Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate in
per-capita GDP for the ﬁve year period 2000-2004. Initial Per-
Capita GDP is the log of per-capita GDP in 1999. In panel (a) the
costs of business start-up is in percentage of the per-capital Gross
National Income as reported in Doing Business in 2005. In panel
(b) is the dollar value of this cost. Both measures of the cost of





t=0 βt(ct−et), where ct is also consumption and
et is the eﬀort to accumulate human capital (knowledge) as speciﬁed below.
Innovators do not save. This assumption should be interpreted as an
approximation to the case in which innovators discount more heavily than
entrepreneurs. The risk neutrality of entrepreneurs implies that the equi-
librium interest rate is equal to the intertemporal discount rate, that is,
r = 1/β − 1.
Firms are owned by entrepreneurs who need the management and inno-






where zt is the level of technology and kt is the capital chosen at time t − 1.
The variable zt changes over time as the ﬁrm adopts new technologies.
The key assumption is that the implementation of more advanced technolo-
gies requires higher knowledge. An innovator with knowledge ht has the
ability to install or implement any technology zt ≤ ht.
7Innovators are needed not only for the introduction and implementation
of a new technology but also to run the ﬁrm once the technology has been
installed. In each period there are two subperiods. The technology is in-
troduced in the ﬁrst sub-period and run in the second. However, once the
technology has been implemented, any innovator can run the ﬁrm, indepen-
dently of his knowledge.
The investment in knowledge, ht+1−ht, requires eﬀort from the innovator.
The required eﬀort depends on the economy-wide level of knowledge Ht, due
to leakage or spillover eﬀects, according to the following function:
et = ϕ(Ht;ht,ht+1)
The function ϕ is strictly decreasing in Ht and ht, strictly increasing in
ht+1, and satisﬁes ϕ(Ht;ht,ht) > 0. We further assume that the function
is homogeneous of degree ρ, where ρ is either 1 or greater than 1. In the
ﬁrst case (ρ = 1) the model generates long-term growth diﬀerences. In the
second (ρ > 1) it generates only transitional growth diﬀerences. Long-term
diﬀerences are only in the level of incomes. We remain agnostic whether an
endogenous growth model is the best representation of cross-country growth
diﬀerences. In the analysis that follows we concentrate on the case with ρ > 1.
This should be interpreted as a detrended model that grows at the exogenous
rate dictated by the world-wide level of technology, which is external to an
individual country.1 It should be clear, however, that the analysis of the
paper can be easily extended to the case in which ϕ is homogeneous of degree
ρ = 1.
Physical capital is technology-speciﬁc: when the ﬁrm innovates, only part
of the physical capital is usable with the new technology. Furthermore, capi-
tal obsolescence increases with the degree of innovation. This is formalized by
assuming that the depreciation rate increases with the size of the innovation,
that is,




Because of capital obsolescence, there is an asymmetry between incumbent
and new ﬁrms. Because new ﬁrms are still uncommitted to any previous
investment, they have greater incentive to innovate.
1We could assume that there is a world-wide level of knowledge H growing at rate g
and the cost to accumulate knowledge takes the form ˜ ϕ(H,Ht,ht,ht+1) where ˜ ϕ is strictly
increasing in H and homogeneous of degree 1. After normalizing all variables by H we
would have the stationary model studied here.
8The competitive structure of the model is as follows. In each period there
is a walrasian market for innovators who can move freely from one ﬁrm to
the other. The market opens twice: before and after the accumulation of
knowledge. Both incumbent and new ﬁrms can participate in this market.
However, the presence of barriers to entry may limit the eﬀective presence
of new ﬁrms. There are diﬀerent ways to model barriers to entry. Here we
adopt a simple formulation and assume that new ﬁrms incur a deadweight
loss proportional to the initial level of knowledge. Given ht+1 the initial
knowledge chosen by a new ﬁrm, the entry cost is τ·ht+1. Our goal is to study
how this cost aﬀects the equilibrium when contracts are not enforceable. We
would like to point out that the results of the paper are robust to alternative
formulations of entry barriers. We have chosen this particular formulation
only for its analytical convenience.2
The last assumption is that ﬁrms remain productive with probability p.
Whether a ﬁrm survives is revealed after the investment in knowledge. This
guarantees that, in the second stage of each period, the mass of innovators
is larger than incumbent (surviving) ﬁrms. This is important for the charac-
terization of the equilibrium as we will emphasize below. We would like to
stress, however, that the value of p is not relevant for the characterization
of the equilibrium as long as it is strictly smaller than 1. Given that, we
assume that p is very close to 1 and, in the characterization of the individual
problems, we will ignore it. The explicit consideration of p will only make
the notation more complex but it would not change the qualitative results.
4 Two-period model
To gauge some intuitions about the key properties of the model, it would
be convenient to consider ﬁrst a simpliﬁed version with only two periods:
period zero and period one. The state variables of the ﬁrm at the beginning
of period zero are h0 and k0. After making the investment decisions, h1 and
k1, the ﬁrm generates output y1 = z
1−α
1 kα
1 in period one. Because z1 = h1,
the output can also be written as y1 = h
1−α
1 kα
1. In this simple version of
2For example, we could assume that the cost is proportional to the initial capital kt+1 or
to the initial output Ah
1−α
t+1 kα
t+1 or to the discounted ﬂows of outputs. None would change
the results but would make the analysis more complex. The assumption of proportionality
guarantees that the equilibrium impact of τ is continuous while the impact of a ﬁxed cost
would be discontinuous, that is, it would have an impact only after it has reached the
prohibitive level.
9the model we assume that physical capital fully depreciates after production.
The innovator receives a payment from the ﬁrm (compensation) at the end
of period zero, after the choice of h1. Payments before the choice of h1 are
not feasible because of the limited enforcement of contracts for the innova-
tor, while allowing for additional payments in period 1 does not change the
results. For the analysis of this section we also assume that there is no dis-
counting and the eﬀort cost does not depend on the economy-wide knowledge
H. The leakage or spillover eﬀect is not relevant when there are only two
periods.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: The ﬁrm starts
period zero with initial states h0 and k0. At this stage the innovator decides
whether to stay or quit the ﬁrm. If he quits, he can be hired by an incumbent
ﬁrm or a new ﬁrm (funded by a new entrepreneur). If the innovator decides
to stay, he will choose the new level of knowledge h1 and implement the
technology z1 = h1. The entrepreneur provides the funds to accumulate the
new physical capital k1. After the investment decision has been made, the
entrepreneur pays w0 to the innovator. At this stage the innovator can still
quit, but he cannot change the level of knowledge h1. The entrepreneur is
the residual claimant of the ﬁrm’s output.
4.1 Equilibrium with entrepreneur’s commitment
To show the importance of contract enforcement, we will ﬁrst characterize
the equilibrium under the assumption that the entrepreneur commits to the
contract. This will facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium without
commitment.
When the entrepreneur commits to the long-term contract, all variables
are chosen at the beginning of the ﬁrst period to maximize the total surplus.
Let D(h0) be the repudiation value before choosing h1 and c D(h1) the repu-
diation value after choosing h1. These functions are endogenous and will be
derived below as the values that the innovator would get by quitting the ﬁrm
and re-entering the market. From now on we will use the hat sign to denote
the functions that are deﬁned after the investment in knowledge. The par-
ticipation of the innovator requires that the value of staying is greater than
the repudiation value before and after the knowledge investment, that is,
w0 − ϕ(h0,h1) ≥ D(h0)
w0 ≥ c D(h1)
10The ﬁrst is the participation constraint before choosing h1 and the second is
the participation constraint after the choice of h1. We will show in the next
section that, if the ﬁrst constraint is satisﬁed, the second is also satisﬁed.
Therefore, in the derivation of the optimal policy we can neglect the second
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w0 − ϕ(h0,h1) ≥ D(h0)
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where the second constraint is the participation constraint for the entrepre-
neur. In writing the problem we have substituted z1 = h1 in the production
and depreciation function.
From the maximization problem it can be veriﬁed that the investment
choices (in knowledge and physical capital) are independent of the choice of
the innovator’s payment w0. The value of w0 is determined by the division
of the surplus, which we specify below.
To determine the repudiation value before the choice of h1, we have to
solve for the optimal investment when the innovator quits the current ﬁrm.
The innovator could be hired by an incumbent or a new ﬁrm, whoever makes
the best oﬀer. However, an incumbent ﬁrm will never oﬀer more than a new
ﬁrm. Therefore, it becomes relevant to determine the oﬀer made by a new












w0 − ϕ(h0,h1) ≥ D(h0)





11The problem of a new ﬁrm diﬀers from the problem solved by an incum-
bent ﬁrm in two respects. First, a new ﬁrm does not have any initial physical
capital, and therefore, it does not incur any obsolescence of capital. Second,
a new ﬁrm has to pay the entry cost τh1. It is still the case, however, that
the choices of h1 and k1 are independent of w0.
Because of competition among potential entrants, the innovator gets the
whole surplus S(h0). This implies that D(h0) = S(h0). Therefore, if the
innovator stays with the incumbent ﬁrm, the payment w0, net of the eﬀort
cost, ϕ(h0,h1), must be at least S(h0). Formally, the participation constraint
in problem (1) becomes:
w0 − ϕ(h0,h1) ≥ S(h0) (3)
Problems (1) and (2) show the diﬀerent incentive to invest for an in-
cumbent versus a new ﬁrm. On the one hand, new ﬁrms do not have any
physical capital and innovations do not generate capital obsolescence. Hence,
they have a greater incentive to innovate than incumbent ﬁrms. On the other,
they must pay the entry cost τh1, which discourages knowledge and capital
accumulation. This is clearly shown by the ﬁrst order conditions for h1 in

















= ϕh1(h0,h1) + τ (5)
where the subscripts denote derivatives.
Condition (4) is for incumbent ﬁrms and condition (5) is for new ﬁrms.
The left-hand-side terms are the marginal productivity of knowledge. The
right-hand-side terms are the marginal costs. The marginal cost for an in-
cumbent ﬁrm is the eﬀort cost incurred by the innovator plus the obsolescence
of physical capital. For a new ﬁrm the obsolescence cost is replaced by the
entry cost. Using the ﬁrst order condition for the choice of physical capital,
which is α(k1/h1)α−1 = 1 for both incumbent and new ﬁrms, the above ﬁrst
order conditions can be rewritten as:
(1 − α)α
α








1−α = ϕh1(h0,h1) + τ (7)
12These two conditions clearly show that, when the entry cost is zero (free
entry), new ﬁrms innovate more than incumbents. However, the innovation
incentive of new ﬁrms declines as the entry cost increases.
Let hOld be the optimal knowledge investment of an incumbent ﬁrm and
hNew the optimal knowledge investment of a new ﬁrm. The following propo-
sition formalizes the above results.
Proposition 1 The knowledge investment of a new ﬁrm hNew is strictly
decreasing in the entry cost τ and there exists ¯ τ > 0 such that hNew = hOld.
Proof 1 This follows directly from conditions (6) and (7). Q.E.D.
In the equilibrium with entrepreneur’s commitment, there will not be any
entrance of new ﬁrms at the beginning of the period and the investment in
knowledge is h1 = hOld. The potential entrance of new ﬁrms only aﬀects
the minimum payment received by an innovator. In the second stage of the
period there will be new ﬁrms entrance because some incumbents become un-
productive. However, the initial knowledge of innovators cannot be changed
at this stage. The next step is to show that this is not an equilibrium when
contracts are not enforceable, that is, there is limited commitment from the
entrepreneur.
4.2 Equilibrium with double-side limited commitment
We want to show ﬁrst that, after the accumulation of knowledge, the entre-
preneur has an incentive to renegotiate the optimal contract. Because the
innovator can always be hired by a new ﬁrm, the value received by an incum-
bent ﬁrm must be at least as large as the surplus generated by a new ﬁrm.
The surplus of new ﬁrms, however, changes before and after the investment
in knowledge, which creates the condition for renegotiation.
Let’s derive ﬁrst the surplus generated by a new ﬁrm after the investment
in knowledge. This is given by:
b S(h1) = max
k1,w0









13w0 ≥ c D(h1)





Because of competition, the innovator gets the whole surplus, that is,
c D(h1) = b S(h1) = w0, and the participation constraint, after the investment
in knowledge, becomes w0 ≥ b S(h1).
If the innovator stays with the ﬁrm and accumulate hOld, the innovator
will renegotiate the promised payments if they are greater than b S(hOld), that
is, greater than the payment that the innovator would obtain by quitting the
ﬁrm with h1 = hOld. In this case the total utility enjoyed by the innovator
would be:
−ϕ(h0,h
Old) + b S(h
Old)
If the innovator quits the ﬁrm at the beginning of the period, he will get the




− ϕ(h0,h) + b S(h)

= −ϕ(h0,h
New) + b S(h
New)
Because hNew 6= hOld, the value of quitting at the beginning of the period,
S(h0), is greater than the value of staying.3 Therefore, the innovator will quit
the ﬁrm at the beginning of the period unless the ﬁrm agrees to the same
knowledge investment chosen by a new entrant ﬁrm, that is, hOld = hNew.
In this way the innovator keeps the repudiation value high and prevents the
entrepreneur from renegotiating. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Without commitment from the entrepreneur, the investment
in knowledge is h1 = hNew.
Proof 2 This follows directly from the analysis above. Q.E.D.
According to the proposition, incumbent ﬁrms accumulate the same level
of knowledge as new ﬁrms. Because hNew is decreasing in τ (see Proposition
3This proves that, in the problem with commitment, if the enforcement constraint is
satisﬁed at the beginning of the period, it is also satisﬁed after the investment in knowledge,
as we assumed.
141), the accumulation of knowledge decreases with the cost of entry. Therefore,
higher are the barriers to entry, and lower is the accumulation of knowledge.
There are several points in the proof of the proposition that should be
emphasized. First, the renegotiation threat of the ﬁrm after the accumula-
tion of knowledge is credible because the ﬁrm can always replace the current
innovator with other innovators. This could be either an innovator still em-
ployed by an incumbent (surviving) ﬁrm, or an innovator who separated from
an exiting ﬁrm. Because in the second stage of the period innovators are in
the long side of the market, they only get the reservation value, which is the
one received from a new ﬁrm.
How would the results change if p = 1 which implies that in the sec-
ond stage of the period the number of innovators is equal to the number of
incumbent ﬁrms? We would have multiple equilibria. Each ﬁrm would rene-
gotiate if all other ﬁrms renegotiate. But each ﬁrm would not individually
renegotiate if all other ﬁrms do not renegotiate. The assumption of a positive
probability of exit, although small, eliminates this multiplicity.
Another point to clarify is the role played by the assumption that knowl-
edge is only necessary for the introduction of technologies but not for man-
aging a ﬁrm after their implementation (although the management still need
to be done by an innovator). This assumption eliminates the following prob-
lem. Suppose that we are in an equilibrium with h1 = hNew 6= hOld. Under
this equilibrium, an individual ﬁrm may be able to make a credible payment
promise to the innovator and convince him to accumulate hOld. Because in
the second stage this is the only innovator with knowledge hOld (all others
have accumulated hNew), there is no innovator in the market that the ﬁrm
can hire to replace him. Consequently, the ﬁrm will be unable to renegoti-
ate.4 This implies that h1 = hNew cannot be an equilibrium. This problem
does not arise if the ﬁrm can use any innovator to run the ﬁrm once the
technology has been adopted.
To summarize, free entry or competition leads to greater investment in
knowledge. The greater investment is not individually eﬃcient due to the
creative destruction of physical capital. Without externalities, this is also
4This is true independently of whether hNew is greater or smaller than hOld. If hNew <
hOld, then all the replacements have lower knowledge and are unable to run the more
advance technology. If hNew > hOld, then the deviating ﬁrm could use innovators with
higher knowledge. But these innovators must be paid more because their reservation value
(when employed by a new ﬁrm) is higher.
15socially ineﬃcient. The presence of splillovers in the accumulation of knowl-
edge, however, may make higher investment desirable. We will re-introduce
the splillovers in the analysis of the inﬁnite horizon model to which we now
turn.
5 The inﬁnite horizon model
In this section we study the general model with inﬁnitely lived agents. This
allows us to derive the level of h endogenously while in the two-period model
we were taking this as given.
To use a more compact notation, we deﬁne the gross output function,
inclusive of undepreciated capital, as follows:
π(ht,kt,ht+1) =
"










In writing this expression, we assume that the ﬁrm uses the best technology
adoptable by the innovator, that is, zt = ht. It is easy to show that the choice
of zt < ht is never optimal.
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium when the entrepreneur commits to
the contract and then we turn to the case of limited enforcement. The com-
parison between these two environments will clarify how contract enforcement
is key for the barriers to entry to aﬀect the accumulation of knowledge.
5.1 Equilibrium with entrepreneur’s commitment
Let Dt(ht) be the repudiation value for the innovator at the beginning of the
period, before investing in knowledge. This is the value that an innovator
with knowledge ht would receive from quitting an incumbent ﬁrm. Further-
more, let c Dt(ht+1) be the value of quitting after choosing the knowledge
investment, and therefore, after exercising eﬀort. At this point the stock of
knowledge is ht+1. These functions also depend on the aggregate states of
the economy, which explains the time subscript. For the moment we take
these two functions as given.
Consider the optimization problem solved by a new ﬁrm (start-up entre-
preneur) that hires an innovator with knowledge capital ht at the beginning
of period t. This is before the innovator makes the new investment in knowl-
edge. Because with competition the innovator gets the whole surplus, it will
be convenient to characterize the optimal contract by maximizing the value
16for the innovator, subject to the enforceability and participation constraints.5





























≥ c Ds(hs+1), for s ≥ t (12)






π(hs,ks,hs+1) − ws − ks+1
i
≥ 0(13)
The objective is the discounted ﬂow of utilities for the innovator. In
each period he receives the payment ws, which is subject to a non-negativity
constraint, and faces the disutility from eﬀort ϕ(Hs;hs,hs+1). Constraints
(11) and (12) are the enforcement constraints. Starting at time t + 1, the
innovator could quit at the beginning of the period, before choosing the
investment in knowledge. In this case the repudiation value is Ds(hs). After
choosing the knowledge investment, the value of quitting becomes c Ds(hs+1).
The last constraint is the participation constraint for the entrepreneur or
break-even condition. This simply says that the value of the contract for the
entrepreneur cannot be negative.
For an innovator hired after investing in knowledge, the value of the
contract is:
















subject to (11), (12) and (13)
The key diﬀerence respect to problem (10) is that the eﬀort to accumulate
knowledge has already been exercised by the innovator and ht+1 is given at
5Alternatively, we could maximize the whole surplus as we did in the analysis of the
two-period model. Of course, this would give the same results.
17this point. Consequently, the current return for the innovator is only wt.
This also explains why the choice of knowledge starts at t + 2. We should
also point out that the constraint (11) must be satisﬁed for all s > t while
constraints (12) and (13) must be satisﬁed for all s ≥ t.
Given the deﬁnitions of Vt(ht) and b Vt(ht+1), it is easy to see that these




− ϕ(Ht;ht,ht+1) + b Vt(ht+1)

(14)
The above optimization problems assume that the repudiation functions
Dt(ht) and c Dt(ht+1) are known. But these functions are endogenous because
they depend on the value functions Vt(ht) and b Vt(ht+1). More speciﬁcally,
the repudiation value is equal to the value of moving to a new ﬁrm, that is,
Ds(hs) = Vs(hs) and c Ds(hs+1) = b Vs(hs+1).
Before proceeding we establish the following property:
Lemma 1 Constraint (12) is always satisﬁed if constraint (11) is satisﬁed.
Proof 1 See Appendix A.
Hence, in characterizing the solution of the optimal contract with entre-
preneur’s commitment, we can ignore the enforcement constraint (12). This
constraint becomes relevant when the entrepreneur does not commit.
5.1.1 Transformed problem and ﬁrst order conditions
In general, the optimization problem depends on the evolution of the economy-
wide knowledge Ht, which in turn depends on the distribution of ﬁrms over
knowledge and physical capital. In the analysis that follows, however, we
concentrate on steady state equilibria where the distribution of ﬁrms and the
average knowledge remain constant. We can then ignore the time subscript
in all value functions. We should emphasize that, although in the steady
state all ﬁrms will have the same h = H, the solution of the contractual
problem requires us to solve for the whole transition experienced by a new
entrant ﬁrm. This is necessary to determine the repudiation value for the
innovator.
18To characterize the solution, it will be convenient to use a transformation
of problem (10). Appendix B shows that, in a steady state equilibrium, the





















where h0 is the initial level of knowledge and µ0 is the inverse of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the participation constraint (11). The function W





















Problem (15) is the problem solved by a new ﬁrm that hires an innovator
with knowledge h0. After starting the ﬁrm and choosing the ﬁrst period
investment, the problem becomes recursive as written in (16). Therefore,
problem (16) is the problem solved by an incumbent ﬁrm, given the states
(µ,h,k).
The variable µ can be interpreted as the weight that a hypothetical plan-
ner gives to the innovator. The weight given to the entrepreneur is 1. Over
time the planner increases the weight µ to insure that the innovator does not
quit the ﬁrm, until µ = 1. Higher is the initial weight µ0 and higher is the
initial value of the contract for the innovator, and therefore, lower is the value
for the entrepreneur. The value of µ0 is determined such that the breaking
even condition for the entrepreneur, that is, constraint (13) is satisﬁed with
the equality sign. See Marcet & Marimon (1997) for details about the use of
the saddle-point formulation.
The solution to problem (15) is characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions:














0) = 1 (20)
19and the solution to problem (16) by the ﬁrst order conditions:















00) = 1 (24)
Here we use subscripts to denote the derivative with respect to the particular
argument. In conditions (17) and (21) the constraints are strict if µ0 > µ,
and conditions (18) and (22) are strict if the innovator’s payments are zero,







We can now provide a formal deﬁnition of a steady state equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A Balanced Growth Equilibrium with entrepreneur’s commit-
ment is deﬁned as: (a) Decision rules for new ﬁrms µN(µ0,h0), wN(µ0,h0),
hN(µ0,h0), kN(µ0,h0); (b) Decision rules for incumbent ﬁrms µ(µ,h), d(µ,h),
h(µ,h), k(µ,h); (c) Initial state µ0(h0) for new ﬁrms; (d) A repudia-
tion function D(h) and a value function V (h); (e) A distribution of ﬁrms
M(µ,h,k). Such that: (i) The decision rules µN(µ0,h), dN(µ0,h0), hN(µ0,h0),
kN(µ0,h0) solve problem (15); (ii) The decision rules µ(µ,h), d(µ,h), h(µ,h),
k(µ,h) solve problem (16); (iii) The initial state µ0(h0) is such that new
ﬁrms break even; (iv) The repudiation function is the value of starting a
new ﬁrm, D(h) = V (h); (v) The distribution M(µ,h,k) remains constant
over time.
The key object of a steady state equilibrium is the constancy of the distri-
bution M(µ,h,k). With positive spillovers, the accumulation of knowledge is
cheaper for agents with h < H and more costly for agents with h > H. This
implies that in equilibrium all ﬁrm will converge to the same level of knowl-
edge. In absence of entry, the steady state distribution of knowledge will be
characterized by a unit mass of ﬁrms with h = H, that is, all innovators have
the average knowledge. We state this formally as follows:
20Proposition 3 There is a unique steady state equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
have the same knowledge H.
Proof 3 See Appendix C.
We can now characterize the steady state equilibrium using the ﬁrst order
conditions derived above. Because all ﬁrms have been active for a long period
of time, they will have µ = µ0 = 1. Furthermore, their knowledge has
converged to H and the capital has converged to K. The steady state value
of H and K are determined by conditions (23) and (24), that is:





βπ2(H,K,H) = 1 (26)
After solving for H and K, we can solve for the payment w. This requires
us to solve for the whole transition dynamics of new entrant ﬁrms as char-
acterized by the ﬁrst order conditions (17)-(24). Even though we limit the
analysis to the steady state, the repudiation value of an innovator is given by
the surplus generated by a new ﬁrm. But to solve for this surplus, we need
to solve for the whole transition experienced by the new ﬁrm.
Before turning to the analysis of the next section , we would like to
emphasize that the steady state values of capital and knowledge are not
aﬀected by the start-up cost τ. This can be easily seen from the fact that τ
does not enter conditions (25) and (26). We state this result formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the entrepreneur commits to the log-term contract, the
steady state values of H and K are independent of the start-up cost τ.
Proof 4 The start-up cost τ does not enter the steady state conditions (25)
and (26). Q.E.D.
We will see in the next section that this property no longer holds when
the entrepreneur is unable to commit to the long-term contract (double-sided
limited enforcement). In this case the cost of business start-up τ will have a
negative impact on the steady state values of H and K.
215.2 Equilibrium without commitment
Without contract enforcement, the entrepreneur could renegotiate the pay-
ments promised to the innovator. In particular, the entrepreneur will rene-
gotiate the contract when the present value of promised payments exceeds
the repudiation value for the innovator.
We have shown in the previous section that the contractual problem
with entrepreneur’s commitment is subject to the following enforcement con-


















which must hold for any s ≥ t. The ﬁrst constraint is before the investment
in knowledge while the second is after the investment.
We have also shown that the second constraint is never binding (see
Lemma 1), that is, after the innovator has chosen the knowledge investment,
the discounted value of promised payments is bigger than the repudiation
value. This implies that, after the investment in knowledge, the entrepreneur
has an incentive to renegotiate the promised payments. Because of renegoti-
ation, the second enforcement constraint must be satisﬁed with equality.
Remembering that Ds(hs) = Vs(hs) and c Ds(hs+1) = b Vs(hs+1), we can
















= −ϕ(Hs;hs,hs+1) + b Vs(hs+1) (28)
In the previous section we have also shown that the two value functions




− ϕ(Ht;ht,h) + b Vt(h)

The solution to this problem, denoted by hNew, is the investment in knowl-
edge chosen by a new ﬁrm. We then have the following proposition:
22Proposition 5 Without entrepreneur’s commitment, the knowledge invest-
ment chosen by an incumbent ﬁrm is equal to the knowledge investment cho-
sen by a new ﬁrm, hNew.
Proof 5 The investment chosen by a new ﬁrm could be diﬀerent from the
one chosen by an incumbent ﬁrm in absence of commitment. Denote this by
hOld. If this is the case, then Vt(ht) > −ϕ(Ht;ht,hOld) + b Vt(hOld). But then
constraints (27) and (28) cannot be both satisﬁed. Therefore, the only feasible
solution is the one for which incumbent ﬁrms choose the same investment
level as new ﬁrms, that is, ht+1 = hNew. Q.E.D.
As for the two-period model, this result has a simple intuition. Because
the entrepreneur can renegotiate the promised payments after the investment
in knowledge, the innovator would not stay with the ﬁrm unless the entre-
preneur agrees to the same level of knowledge chosen by a new ﬁrm. In this
way, the innovator keeps the outside value high and prevents the ﬁrm from
renegotiating.
Denote by hs+1 = gs(hs) the knowledge investment of a new ﬁrm created
at time s ≥ t. The optimization problem for a new ﬁrm created at time t




















≥ Ds(hs), for s ≥ t






π(hs,ks,hs+1) − ws − ks+1
i
≥ 0
hs+1 = gs(hs), for s ≥ t + 1
After the ﬁrst period, the investment in knowledge is determined by the
function gs(hs), which is taken as given by the ﬁrm.
23Following the same steps of Appendix B, we can show that in a steady





















where h0 is the initial level of knowledge and µ0 is the inverse of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the participation constraint for the entrepreneur.



























As in the case with entrepreneur’s commitment, the problem can be di-
vided in two parts: the problem solved by new ﬁrms and the problem solved
by incumbent ﬁrms. For new ﬁrms the problem is similar to the case of
commitment. For incumbent ﬁrms, instead, the investment in knowledge is
determined by the policy function g(h), which is external to the ﬁrm.
The optimal value of h0 chosen by a new ﬁrm in problem (30) also depends
on the investment policy that the ﬁrm will follow in the future, that is, g(h).
Therefore, we have to solve a non-trivial ﬁxed point problem. This is in
addition to the ﬁxed point problem in the determination of the repudiation
function D(h).
The ﬁrst order conditions for problem (30) are given by (17)-(20). For
problem (31) they are given by (21), (22) and (24). Notice that condition
(23) is no longer relevant because incumbent ﬁrms take the policy h0 = g(h)






















We can now deﬁne a steady state equilibrium for this economy.
Deﬁnition 2 A Steady State Equilibrium without entrepreneur’s commit-
ment is deﬁned as: (a) Decision rules for new ﬁrms µN(µ0,h0), wN(µ0,h0),
hN(µ0,h0), kN(µ0,h0) for new ﬁrms; (b) Decision rules for incumbent ﬁrms
µ(µ,h), w(µ,h), k(µ,h); (c) An investment rule for incumbent ﬁrms g(h);
(d) Initial state µ0(h0) for new ﬁrms; (e) A repudiation function D(h) and
a value function V (h); (f) A distribution of ﬁrms M(µ,h,k). Such that:
(i) The decision rules µN(µ0,h0), wN(µ0,h0), hN(µ0,h0), kN(µ0,h0) solve
problem (30); (ii) The decision rules µ(µ,h), w(µ,h), k(µ,h) solve problem
(31); (iii) The investment rule of incumbent ﬁrms is equal to the invest-
ment policy of new ﬁrms, g(h) = hN(µ0(h),h); (iv) The initial state µ0(h0)
is such that new ﬁrms break even; (v) The repudiation function is the value
of starting a new ﬁrm, D(h) = V (h); (vi) The distribution M(µ,h,k) re-
mains constant over time.
The deﬁnition is similar to the one provided for the case of commitment,
with the exception of condition (iii). This condition imposes that the knowl-
edge investment chosen by an incumbent ﬁrm is equal to the investment
chosen by a new ﬁrm with the same initial states.
The next step is to show that, because of capital obsolescence for incum-
bent ﬁrms, the knowledge investment chosen by a new ﬁrm is higher than
the level preferred by an incumbent ﬁrm and this leads to higher income.
Substituting the envelope term derived in the previous section in equation
(19), the ﬁrst order condition for the investment in knowledge of new ﬁrms



































Because incumbent ﬁrms innovate at the same rate as new ﬁrms, this is
also the condition that determines the investment in knowledge of incumbent
ﬁrms. Therefore, in order to determine whether the lack of commitment from
the entrepreneur leads to higher or lower knowledge, we have to compare
25this condition to the one determining the optimal investment in knowledge
when the entrepreneur is able to commit to the long-term contract. This is
condition (23).
Let HE be the knowledge in the economy with contract enforcement and
HLE the knowledge in the economy with limited enforcement. The following
proposition characterizes the steady state equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The steady state knowledge HLE is strictly decreasing in τ
and there exists ¯ τ > 0 such that HLE > HE for τ < ¯ τ and HLE < HE for
τ > ¯ τ.
Proof 6 See Appendix E.
Therefore, when contracts are not enforceable (double-sided limited en-
forcement), the start-up cost is harmful for the economy. With low barriers
the economy would experience an even higher level of income than in the
economy with enforceable contracts. Depending on the importance of the
externality, this could be welfare improving.
6 Quantitative application
The goal of this section is to study how much of the variation in cross-country
incomes can be explained by diﬀerences in the cost of business start-up. We
start with the assignment of the parameter values and the speciﬁcation of
the functional forms.
The discount factor is set to β = 0.95, implying an annual interest rate
of about 5 percent. The production function takes the form Ah1−αkα with A
normalized to 1. The parameter α represents the capital income share and it
is set to 0.33. The depreciation of capital is speciﬁed as: δt = ¯ δ+δ·(zt+1/zt−
1). We choose δ = 0.1 but we would like to emphasize that this parameter
is not important for the sensitivity of the steady state equilibrium to τ. The
parameter ¯ δ, instead, determines the capital-income ratio independently of
the start-up cost. We choose a value of 0.066 which implies a capital-income
ratio of 2.8.
The eﬀort cost function is derived from the accumulation equation for the
stock of knowledge, which is assumed to take the form:






26where Ht is the economy-wide level of knowledge, et is the eﬀort cost to
accumulate knowledge and the parameters satisfy φ < 1, θ < 1 and ρ > 1.
The parameter θ captures the importance of leakage or spillover eﬀects while
ρ captures the importance of world-wide knowledge which is external to the
country. By inverting we get the eﬀort cost function:







which is homogeneous of degree ρ.
Assuming that the economy grows at an exogenous rate of 3 percent,
the stock of knowledge must also grow at this rate in the steady state. In
the detrended economy this corresponds to a depreciation rate of 3 percent
which requires φ = 0.97. The parameter θ is not important for the steady
state. It only determines the optimality of the equilibrium. The important
parameter is the degree of homogeneity ρ. Unfortunately, there are no direct
measures of ρ. Therefore, we will show the results for alternative values of
this parameter.
We start by choosing a value of ρ that optimizes the ﬁt of the model
with the data. More speciﬁcally, we chose ρ to minimize the sum of square
deviations between the outputs predicted by the model for each country
(given the observed cost of business start up) and the actual per-capita GDP.
We limit the sample to countries with a start-up cost smaller than 100 percent
to eliminate outliers. This reduces the sample size to 104 countries. We also
normalize the model so that it replicates the highest per-capita income with
τ = 0. In the 2004 sample the country with the highest per-capita GDP was
Ireland with about 40,000 dollars.
Figure 2 plots the actual values of per-capita GDP and the values pre-
dicted by the model when ρ = 1.014. This is the value that optimizes the ﬁt
of the model.
We have also calculated the ‘optimal’ steady state level of output. This is
the output produced if investment was chosen by a benevolent planner who
takes into account the externality in the accumulation of knowledge. The
steady state levels of H and K in the planner solution are found by solving
the ﬁrst order conditions:
−π3(H,K,H) + ϕ3(H;H,H) = β

π1(H,K,H) − ϕ2(H;H,H) − ϕ1(H;H,H)

βπ2(H,K,H) = 1
27Figure 2: Steady state output for diﬀerent entry costs.
These are similar to conditions (25) and (26) except for the additional term
ϕ1(H;H,H) in the ﬁrst equation. This term captures the externality in the
accumulation of knowledge which is taken into account by the planner but
ignored by the atomistic agents in a competitive economy. In this particu-
lar calibration with θ = 0.15, barriers to entry are always ineﬃcient. More
speciﬁcally, the optimal level of output is about 75 percent above the com-
petitive output when τ = 0. However, this depends on the value of θ. If the
externality is small, then moderate barriers to business start-up are optimal.
This is because, limited enforcement of contracts leads to over-accumulation
of knowledge.
The next Figure 3 adds to the previous graph the predictions of the
model for alternative values ρ. As we increase the degree of homogeneity of
the cost function, the model is less successful in capturing large diﬀerences
in per-capita income. A larger value of ρ implies that the economy depends
more heavily on the world-wide level of knowledge, which is external to an
28individual country. Therefore, it becomes more diﬃcult to generate large
cross-country diﬀerences. On the other hand, when ρ is very small, the
economy depends only marginally on the world-wide knowledge. In the limit
the long-term growth rates will be diﬀerent across countries. Therefore, the
model could generate any level of cross-country heterogeneity.
Figure 3: Steady state output for diﬀerent entry costs.
7 Conclusion
Modern technologies are highly complementary to skilled labor. This im-
plies that the adoption of these technologies requires the accumulation of
innovation skills or knowledge from workers and managers. In absence of a
commitment devise or enforcement of contracts, under-accumulation of skills
may result. However, we have shown that free entry can create an incentive
mechanism to accumulate knowledge even if contracts are not enforceable.
Free entry increases the demand of knowledge capital and creates an outside
29opportunity for those accumulating knowledge which can be used against
any renegotiation attempts from the current employer. It is this outside op-
portunity that guarantees the agent the reward for accumulating knowledge
when contracts are not enforceable.
Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical ﬁnding
that the cost of starting a business is negatively correlated with the level of
development and growth of a country.
30A Proof of Lemma 1














≥ −ϕ(Hs;hs,hs+1) + b Ds(hs+1)
Therefore, to show that the second constraint is satisﬁed when the ﬁrst constraint
is satisﬁed, it is enough to show that Ds(hs) ≥ −ϕ(Hs;hs,hs+1) + b Ds(hs+1) for
any value of hs+1. From the deﬁnition of the repudiation values we have that
Ds(hs) = maxh{−ϕ(Hs;hs,h) + b Ds(h)} ≥ −ϕ(Hs;hs,hs+1) + b Ds(hs+1) for any
hs+1. Q.E.D.
B Saddle-point formulation
Consider problem (10). As proved in Lemma 1, constraint (12) is not binding.
Therefore, we have to consider only constraints (11) and (13). Let γs and λt be
the Lagrange multipliers associated with these two constraints. The Lagrangian






































Deﬁne ˜ µs recursively as follows: ˜ µs+1 = ˜ µs + γs, with ˜ µt = 0. Using this

























31Deﬁne µs = (1 + ˜ µs)/λt for s ≥ t + 1 with µt = 1/λt. Substituting we get:
L = λt
(
















We now look at the special case of a steady state equilibrium in which the stock












−(µt+1 − µt)D(ht) + βW(µt+1,ht+1,kt+1)
)











−(µ0 − µ)D(h) + βW(µ0,h0,k0)
)
The initial state µt is determined such that the participation constraint for the
entrepreneur is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The accumulation of knowledge for an incumbent ﬁrm is dictated by the ﬁrst order
condition (23). After substituting the envelope condition, it reads:
−π3(h,k,h0) + µ0ϕ3(H;h,h0) = β

π1(h,k,h0) − µ0ϕ2(H;h,h0) − (µ0 − µ)D1(h)

We know that the state µ will eventually converge to 1 for an incumbent
ﬁrm. Therefore, without new entry, all ﬁrms will have µ = 1 in a steady state
equilibrium. Furthermore, h = H in a steady state equilibrium. Therefore, the
above condition can be rewritten as:
ϕ3(H;H,H) + βϕ2(H;H,H) = π3(H,K,H) + βπ1(H,K,H) (34)
32The right-hand-side terms of this expression remain constant in a steady state.
In fact, taking into account the functional form of π (see equation (9)) and imposing
the steady state conditions h = H and k = K, we have that π3(H,K,H) =
−δ(K/H) and π1(H,K,H) = δ(K/H) + (1 − α)A(K/H)α. These two terms
only depend on the ratio K/H. But condition (24)—that is, π2(H,K,H) = 1 +
αA(K/H)α−1 = 1—requires the constancy of K/H.
Let’s look now at the left-hand-side terms. Because ϕ is homogenous of degree
ρ > 1, the derivatives ϕ2 and ϕ3 are homogeneous of degree ρ − 1. Therefore, the
left-hand-side can be written as





Because ρ − 1, this term is strictly increasing in H, converges to zero as H → 0
and to inﬁnity as H → ∞. Therefore, there exists a unique value of H that solves
condition (34). Q.E.D.
D Derivation of the envelope condition (32)


















g1(h) − (µ0 − µ)D1(h) + βW2(µ0,h0,k0)g1(h)
From condition (19) we have
τ + µ0ϕ3(H;h0,h0) = βW2(µ0,h0,k0)
This is the condition for new ﬁrms which, with limited enforcement, must be



















E Proof of Proposition 6
All ﬁrms are alike in the steady state. Therefore, h = H. In a steady state
equilibrium µ0 must be equal to 1. In fact, because potential new ﬁrms start with
33the same H as incumbents, µ0 must be equal to the µ of incumbents ﬁrms, which
is 1. Imposing µ0 = 1, the ﬁrst order condition for the accumulation of knowledge
(equation (33)) can be written as:








With commitment, the ﬁrst order condition for the accumulation of knowledge is






Let’s notice ﬁrst that, given the structure of function π deﬁned in (9), con-
ditions (20) and (24) will uniquely determine the capital-knowledge ration K/H,
which are the same in both economies independently of τ. Second, the derivatives
π1(H,K,H) and π3(H,K,H) only depend on the ratio K/H which, as observed
above, is uniquely determined by conditions (20) and (24).
The homogeneity of degree ρ of the cost function ϕ implies that the deriva-













Hρ−1 = βπ1(H,K,H) + π3(H,K,H) (37)
Because ρ − 1, the left-hand-side terms are strictly increasing in H, converge to
zero as H → 0 and to inﬁnity as H → ∞. We further observe that, as shown in
the proof of Proposition 3, the terms π1 and π3 only depend on the ratio K/H
which is uniquely pinned down by conditions (20) and (24).
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the start-up cost is zero, that is, τ = 0. We
start by assuming that the term βg1(H) < 1, which we will prove below. Because
π3(H,K,H) < 0, the assumption that βg1(H) < 1 implies that the right-hand-side
of (36) is bigger than the right-hand-side of (37). Therefore, the left-hand-side of
(36) must also be bigger. This implies a higher H. Therefore, HLE > HE.
Notice that, without capital obsolescence, π3(H,K,H) = 0. Therefore, conditions
(36) and (37) are indistinguishable. This implies that the commitment of the
entrepreneur does not aﬀect the long-term growth as long as τ = 0.
Let’s consider now the case in which τ > 0. This variable only aﬀects condition
(36). If the term βg1(H) < 1, then an increase in τ reduces the right-hand-side of
(36). The reduction in the left-hand-side term then requires a lower value of H.
34For a suﬃciently large τ, the steady state level of knowledge declines to the point
in which HLE < HE.
To complete the proof we have to show that βg1(H,H) < 1. Q.E.D.
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